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 ABSTRACT Over the last decade, the Communist Party of Nepal­Maoists Center                     
(CPN­Maoist Center) has suffered from fragmentation. Currently led by Prime                   
Minister and chairman Prachanda, tensions within the CPN­Maoist Center have                   
resulted in former CPN­Maoist Center chairmanMohan Baidya splitting with the party                       
in 2012, followed by former Prime Minister Dr. BaburamBhattarai in 2015. Prachanda,                         
Baidya and Bhattarai, who are credited for igniting the Maoist People’s War                       
(1996­2006), now lead three separate political factions within parliament. Standard                   
explanations for the splits point to ideological differences as the basis of the splits, due                             
to the CPN­Maoist Center’s history of factionalism along ideological lines. This study                       
investigates the conditions which led to the splits between Maoist War leaders                       
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The Communist Party of Nepal­Maoist Center (CPN­Maoist Center) has a turbulent                     
history of internal party conflict. Led by Prime Minister and chairman Pushpa Kamal                         
Dahal (better known by his nom de guerre  “Prachanda”), the CPN­Maoist Center has                         
suffered a series of party fractures, with a number of academics attributing the party’s                           
division to ideological differences amongst leaders. In 2015, former Prime Minister Dr.                       
Baburam Bhattarai (2011­2013) split with the CPN­Maoist Center, to form his own                       1
political party, Naya Shakti Nepal (NSN) (which translates to “New Power Nepal”)                       
(Himalayan Times 2015a; Agence France­Presse 2016). Before Bhattarai, former                 
CPN­Maoist Center senior vice chairman Mohan Pokharel Baidya ( nom de guerre                     
“Kiran”) left the party in 2012, forming the Communist Party of Nepal­Revolutionary                       
Maoist (CPN­Revolutionary Maoist) (Aashar 2012). Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya,                 
who are credited with launching the Maoist People’s War against the Parliamentary                       2
Democracy in 1996, now all stand divided (Dixit 2012). Owing to these splits, the                           
CPN­Maoist Center has suffered major setbacks in national politics, losing the                     
government majority in the 2014 Constituent Assembly elections, reducing the party’s                     
national  standing  to  third  and  weakening  the  party  structurally  (Upadhyay  2014).  
The CPN­Maoist Center has had many vital successes as a party. In 2006, ten                           
years after launching the People’s War, under the military leadership of Prachanda and                         







 Center—formally known then as the Communist Party of Nepal­Maoist                 
(CPN­Maoist)—was successfully able to end the the 240­year­old Hindu monarchy                   
(British Broadcasting Corporation 2013; Upadhyay 2014; Himalayan Times 2016a).                 
Thereafter, parliament declared Nepal to be a federal democratic republic (Thapa and                       
Sharma 2009). Subsequently, during the post­war elections of 2008 the CPN­Maoist                     
Center was able to garner the majority vote from the public, winning 120 out of 240                               
(first­past­the­post) parliamentary seats, thus assuming power (Agence France­Presse               
2016; Election Commission of Nepal 2008). Despite this outcome, the CPN­Maoist                     
Center has been unsuccessful in altering the historical relations of multi­layered                     
oppression in Nepal—the motive force behind the decade long war—with former                     
CPN­Maoist Center leaders Bhattarai and Baidya, establishing new political forces                   
(Dahal  2008). 
Since the signing of the peace accord between the Maoists and government in                         
2006, the future state of the Maoist movement and the nation­state of Nepal, has                           
troubled a number of academics and policymakers alike. Given the historical                     
denouncements from Maoist communist parties in Nepal, the standard explanation for                     
why Bhattarai and Baidya split with the Prachanda­led CPN­Maoist Center is largely                       
attributed to ideological differences between the leaders (Sharma 2016; Thapa 2003).                     
However, both Bhattarai and Baidya are known as the ideologues of the party, with all                             
three leaders sharing a common agenda during the insurgency (Thapa 2003; Adhikari                       





 This study investigates the conditions which led to the recent splits between                       
Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, the orchestrators of the Maoist People’s War.                     
Through a combination of literature review and personal interview surveys, this study                       
examines  the  extent  to  which  these  splits  are  a  product  of  ideological  differences. 
The structure of this study is organized as follows; section one is dedicated to                           
contextualizing the study and providing the historical background of the CPN­Maoist                     
Center. This is followed by a review of literature on the Maoist Movement in Nepal,                             
factionalismwithin the CPN­Maoist Center and political happenings in Nepal. In section                       
three, research methodology and method of data analysis are detailed. Subsequently,                     
research findings and analysis are presented. Finally, I conclude with a summary of my                           
research, with the hopes that this study contributes to the greater understanding of the                           
splits between Maoist insurgency leaders Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, factionalism                   
within  the  CPN­Maoist  Center  and  Nepal’s  domestic  political  situation.  
2 Historicising  the  Communist  Party  of  Nepal­Maoist  Center 
Understanding the factionalism within the CPN­Maoist Center and recent splits                   
between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya requires a recognition of the conditions from                       
which the party emerged. The original Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was formed                         3
in 1940. Yet, the origins of the communist movement led by the CPN­Maoist Center                           4
extend back to the late 1960’s. At that time, political parties were banned in Nepal and                               







 the Panchayat raj system. However, the CPN­Maoist Center still remained active                     5
underground. Later, due to ideological differences the CPN split vertically along party                       
lines: pro­Soviet vs. pro­Chinese groups. During that time, the communist movement in                       
Nepal was in chaos with various groups organizing on their own, many leaders either in                             
jail or exile in India. After a failed armed uprising was attempted by a group of young                                 
rogue communist working in Jhapa district (in 1971), some of the old guard—many                         
newly released from prison—tried to re­establish order to the communist movement,                     
marred by factionalism. In 1974, the old guard came together to hold Communist Party                           
of Nepal’s Fourth Congress (CPN­Fourth Congress), which would later grow into a                       
party under the same name, becoming an essential force within the communist                       
movement over the next decade. In 1983, due to inner­party disagreements over who                         
the main enemy of the party was, the CPN­Fourth Congress split leading to the                           
formation of the Communist Party of Nepal­Masal (CPN­Masal). In 1985, the                     
Bhattarai­led CPN­Masal underwent further division, resulting in the formation of the                     
Communist Party of Nepal­Mashal (CPN­Mashal) led by Baidya. In 1989, Prachanda                     
would assume leadership from Baidya, becoming the general secretary of the faction                       
(Thapa  2003;  Upreti  2008). 
During the 1990’s, the CPN­Fourth Congress and other communist groups                   
unified to fight the Panchayat system, forming the United Left Front (ULF). After                         









 finding their input suppressed within the coalition. One of the parties to leave the ULF                             
coalition was the CPN­Fourth Congress, forming a new alliance with the Prachand­led                       
CPN­Mashal, creating the Communist Party of Nepal­Unity Center (CPN­Unity                 
Center).  
Nineteen ninety­one marked the first multi­party election held since the people’s                     
movement against the Panchayat system. Under the banner of the United People’s                       
Front (UPF), the CPN­Unity Center decided compete in the polls, as an attempt to                           
reach a larger audience, while also using the elections as a forum to critique the                             
parliamentary system. To much surprise, under the banner of the UPF the CPN­Unity                         
Center won nine seats. However, this victory was short­lived. In 1994, the party split                           
between a Prachanda­led faction which championed for an armed uprising and one                       
which pushed for a more cautious path to revolution. This breakup was reflected in the                             
national political front of the UPF, as both factions contended for recognition from the                           
election commissions. The Bhattarai­led faction of the UPF aligned with Prachanda and                       
Baidya. In turn, they were denied recognition by the election commission, boycotting the                         
1994 elections in response. In March of 1995, the Prachanda­led CPN­Unity Center                       
faction renamed itself the Communist Party of Nepal­Maoist (CPN­Maoist), formally                   









Despite their extensive history of party division, the CPN­Maoist was still able to secure                           
the parliamentary majority in the post­war elections of 2008 (Thapa 2009; Agence                       
France­Presse 2016). The overwhelming public support of the Maoist was attributed                     
their ability to mobilize support, through their strategic use of communist ideology which                         
centered the rights ofmarginalized groups (ie.women, indigenous nationalities and  Dalit                    7
). Through conducting political education which challenged traditional norms and                   
practices which reaffirmed social hierarchies, the Maoist enabled oppressed groups to                     
imagine a revolutionary alternative to their oppression. By recognizing the plight of                       
marginalized groups, the Maoist were not only able to incorporate “fluid groups” like the                           
Dalit , indigenous nationalities, women and unemployed youth into the armed struggle,                     
but win the support of the public which transferred to the 2008 elections (Lawoti 2009;                             
Basnett  2009).  
2 Post­Insurgency  Unification  Process 
After winning the parliamentary majority in 2008, there seemed to be a consensus                         
amongst CPN­Maoist leaders that mass party unification was needed to ensure that                       
their goal of establishing a socialist people’s republic of Nepal succeeded. At this time,                           
Prachanda was credited for unifying several communist party splinters, forming the                     
Seven­Party Alliance (SPA). The mission of the SPA was to form a consensus                         
government after the 2008 constituent assembly, working together to write a new                       






 communism” (Lawoti 2009; Himalayan Times 2008; Mishra 2008). In 2009, after a                       
joint meeting of CPN­M and CPN­Unity Center central committee members was                     
called, they decided to name the new alliance the Unified Party of Nepal                         
Communist­Maoist (UCPN­Maoist) (South Asian Terrorism Portal 2016). However,               
this  period  of  unification  was  short  lived. 
2 Baidya­Prachanda  Split 
With Baidya choosing to leave the UCPN­Maoist in 2012—taking along 45 of 149                         
central committee members—attempts of mass party unification were halted (Aashar                   
2012). Baidya ascribed the splits to the UCPN­Maoist party’s leadership, which had                       
“‘annihilated the achievements’” of the decade long’s People’s War. According to                     
Baidya­allied breakaway faction leader Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma: “‘When               
[UCPN­Maoist] entered into [the] peace [agreement], there was a challenge to retain                       
the party’s revolutionary spirit. Until a couple of years ago, Prachanda was clearly allied                           
with us, but he deviated from it. After all shorts of attempts, we concluded that there’s                               
no alternative but to form a new party’” (British Broadcasting Company 2012).                       
Baidya’s faction has dubbed Prachanda and Bhattarai—who at the time was serving as                         
Prime Minister—as “Red Traitors” and “Neo­Revisionists,” accusing them of                 
“compromising on the objectives of the People’s War” (Ghimire 2012). Baidya’s                     
criticism stemmed from Prachanda’s and Bhattarai’s failures to produce a new                     
constitution in the mandated period. The constitution was supposed to serve as a                         
stepping stone, putting the Maoist a little bit closer to establishing a people’s republic.                           




 himself with the Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of Nepal­Unified                     
Marxist­Leninist (CPN­Unified Marxist­Leninist). As a result, the document reversed                 
many of the party’s achievements on inclusion (Jha 2016). Baidya’s criticism also                       
stemmed from Prachanda failing to “ensure that former Maoist fighters were integrated                       
into the army ‘in a respected manner’” (British Broadcasting Company). After declaring                       
his split, Baidya called for “revolutionary forces” to join his new party calling it “a                             
beginning  of  a  new  chapter  in  the  country”  (British  Broadcasting  Company  2012). 
When Baidya declared his split from the CPN­Maoist Center and the                     8
formation of his new party, he claimed that unity with the UCPN­Maoist was still                           
possible if Prachanda and Bhattarai corrected their past mistakes. Years since the split,                         
Prachanda has reached out to Baidya’s party in attempts to reunify. Baidya, hesitant to                           
reunite with the CPN­Maoist Center, cited ideological differences as the reason. In a                         
six­page appeal to the Thapa­led (pro­unity) faction of the CPN­Revolutionary                   
Maoist, Baidya claimed that Prachanda’s unification efforts were a ploy to rid Nepal’s                         
Communist movement of revolutionary ideology, which Baidya accuses Prachanda and                   
Bhattarai of straying from after coming to power (British Broadcasting Company 2012:                       
Sedhai  2016;  Himalayan  Times  2016b).  
While standard explanations point towards ideological differences being the                 
basis of the Baidya­Prachanda split, other literature suggests that the split was about the                           
control of state power and wealth in the hands of Prachanda (Dixit 2012). While it is                               






 Bhattarai were willing to relinquish their positions as chairman and Prime Minister, a                         
contingency for Baidya’s unity. Furthermore, both Baidya and Bhattarai often criticized                     
Prachanda for his monopoly over party resources (Ghimire 2012; Jeevan 2013). In                       
2011,  Baidya  released  a  18­point  leaflet  accusing  Prachanda  of: 
 
(1) Eclecticism in philosophy. (2) On the political front, is seen moving                       
toward rightist reformism and national capitulationism from his centrist                 
opportunism. (3) Prachanda recognizes that party’s prime contradiction               
lay with India, its agents and the local feudal forces, but in practice he                           
is acting just the otherwise. (4) Prachanda focuses on cooperating with                     
the local forces that favor Indian expansionism and its agents in Nepal.                       
(5) Verbally Prachanda stresses on cooperation with nationalists,               
communists and republicans but in practice he has been cooperating                   
with the Indian expansionists and their cohorts. (6) At a time when our                         
territories are being continuously encroached upon and demographic               
invasion is taking place, Dahal has made the citizenship distribution                   
process flexible. (7) Prachanda has supported Indian investments in                 
Upper Karnali and Arun­III hydro­power projects. (8) Prachanda is                 
impeding party’s fraternal relations with international revolutionary             
forces, whereas he has also been maintaining relations with class                   
enemies more so, Indian intelligence agents. (9) On the issue of                     
financial discipline, [Prachanda] is seen tilted toward corruption.               
[Prachanda] is seen having the tendency of doing anything — both                     
moral and immoral — for the sake of power, money and prestige. (10)                         
Prachanda has deliberately left the party without an accounting system                   
and misused financial means and resources in an individualistic way.                   
(11) Prachanda deviated from the party’s ideological goals by not                   
launching appropriate programs to counter the party’s principal enemy                 
India. (12) Despite being said that we would go for a federal system                         
with autonomy to ethnicities, [Prachanda] has emphasized unitary and                 
centralized system. (13) Financial irregularities and misuse of               
resources. (14) Self­centric individualistic tendency, intolerance toward             
those holding dissent abusing his power to silence their voices. (15)                     
Fascist tendency: extending relations with the Indian intelligence               
agencies. (16) Disarming the PLA and emptying the cantonments in the                     
name of “regrouping” without forging a national security policy,                 
controlling the open border and setting up a border security force. (17)                       
Bourgeois theory of separation of power, and to minimize the                   
participation of people in the judiciary under the pretext of judicial                     
independence, instead of empowering the People s´ Assembly. (18)               
Agreeing to make appointments of judges by a commission, not by the                       





 In the 18­point leaflet, two of the 18 accusations against Prachanda explicitly support                         
the explanation that the Baidya­Prachanda split was a product of ideological                     
differences, with many—if not all—of Baidya’s accusations having the ability to be                       9
streamlined to fit into the category of ideological differences. Additionally, two of the 18                           
accusations also suggest that monopolization of power and resources and corruption                     10
could have also been potential reasons for Baidya (and Bhattarai) splitting with the                         
CPN­Maoist  Center  (Ghimire  2012;  Jeevan  2013). 
2 Bhattarai­Prachanda  Split 
A week after splitting with the CPN­Maoist Center , Bhattarai spoke at an interaction                         11
program at Gorkha headquarters, detailing his plan to form a “new political force”                         
launch an “economic revolution” in Nepal (Himalayan Times 2015c). According to                     
Bhattarai, “[He] did not want to split the party. [He] just [wanted] to constitute a new                               
political force” (Himalayan Times 2015b). Yet, it is suggested that the split was highly                           
anticipated; since 2012, Bhattarai has been advocating for “leadership of a new type”                         
(Sharma 2016). The break was delayed due to the prolongment of the constitution                         
drafting process, which Bhattarai is said to have been the breaking point for the Maoist                             
insurgency leader (Agence France­Presse 2016). According to Bhattarai, the failure of                     
the constitution to address the demands brought forth from agitating parties, had created                         
an atmosphere of political instability in Nepal (Himalaya Times 2015). In turn, Bhattarai                         









 identity, liberty and [economic] prosperity of the people” (Agence France­Presse                   
2016).  
Prachanda and Bhattarai are said to have disagreed on many essential issues                       
concerning political line and party ideology, throughout their underground days.                   
Prachanda’s loyalists are said to have often accused Bhattarai of trying to “oust”                         
Prachanda  ideologically  (Sharma  2016).  
During Bhattarai’s prime ministership, his main goal was to carry out an                       
“economic and social revolution.” Many of Bhattarai’s former Maoist comrades                   
accused him of pushing forward a neoliberalist agenda when he signed the Bilateral                         
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) with India, against the                   
decision of the CPN­Maoist Center (Sigh 2011). Under the BIPPA agreement,                     
“workers basic rights and protections [are] waived within ‘special economic zones’...the                     
right of the state to support and promote domestic enterprise...the right of workers to                           
struggle against mistreatment or for basic livelihood and adequate working conditions”                     
are all traded, to “bring in investment” which Bhattarai said was in the best interests of                               
Nepal  (Des  Chene  2014).  
After his stint as Prime Minister, Bhattarai redirected all of his energy into his                           
new political party, gathering over 100 entrepreneurs, industrialists, bankers and traders                     
together, laying out his party’s economic agenda. During this conference, Bhattarai said                       
his new political platform would have “socialist orientation.” Simultaneously, Bhattarai                   
urged the private sector not be concerned with the use of the word “socialism” in the                               




 constitution, but it is practicing capitalism’” (Himalayan Times 2015c). In the aftermath,                       
Prachanda  has  accused  Bhattarai  of  “joining  hands  with  the  Bourgeoisies,”  saying:  
 
Baburam Bhattarai was head of the people’s government during the                   
war and his orders were behind people’s sacrifices and the changes in                       
this country. So, he will not be free of accountability just by saying that                           
he has now taken another path. Therefore, I urge him to join the new                           
Maoist force rather than promote the bourgeoisies...unification is               




Since leaving the CPN­Maoist Center, it seems that Bhattarai has renounced                     
communist ideology saying, “There is no alternative to capitalism in today’s world and                         
we have to follow that...I have to unlearn what I’ve learnt in 40 years and learn                               
something new” (Himalayan Times 2015c). It can be said that it is unclear what                           
Bhattarai means by, “I have to unlearn what I’ve learnt...and learn something new,” as                           
his rhetoric often contradicts itself (eg. “socialist orientation” vs. “...no alternative to                       
capitalism”). However, despite Bhattarai’s use communist terms like “socialist” to                   
describe his political platform, the majority of his rhetoric suggests that his platform                         
mimics  a  more  neoliberal—and  therefore  anti­communist—ideology.  
Similarly to the Baidya­Prachanda split, ideology factored into Bhattarai’s                 
decision to split with the Prachanda­led CPN­Maoist Center. Given Bhattarai’s public                     
renouncement of communist ideology, I argue that ideological differences was a core                       
contributor to his split with the CPN­Maoist Center. Furthermore, sources suggest that                       
Bhattarai had been planning to split with the CPN­Maoist Center for a while—in hopes                           




 been an underlying reason of why Bhattarai split with the Prachanda­led party. Finally,                         
Bhattarai frequently proposing that his party will be a catalyst for “economic revolution”                         
and “prosperity,” through his party’s economic agenda, which differs in many ways from                         
the original objective of the Maoist insurgency—to establish socialism in                   
Nepal—suggesting that Bhattarai’s agenda has shifted from his former comrades                   
(Himalayan  Times  2015;  Agence  France­Presse  2016)  
Research  Methodology 
In order to understand the factions between Maoist insurgency leaders Prachanda,                     
Bhattarai and Baidya, I employed semi­structured personal interview surveys of                   
political party leaders, mid­level cadres  and political scientists. All interviews were                     12
conducted in Kathmandu, over the course of two weeks. Participants were chosen                       
using opportunity sampling, conducted in a two­tiered manner. The first­tier of                     
participants were selectively chosen based on their availability, willingness and ability                     13
to enhance understanding of the study topic. Using the same technique, the second­tier                         
of participants were chosen based on references from participants in the first­tier. My                         
chosen method comes directly from the exploratory nature of this study and the lack of                             
in­depth and critical sources on post­war Maoist parliamentary politics in Nepal.                     
Furthermore, both qualitative and quantitative methods of data interpretation are                   14











While all interview participants have some form of background in Nepalese politics,                       
there are two strata of respondents; first­stratum and second­stratum. The                   
first­stratum of respondents are those who are affiliated with a political party and                         15
working within a party as a political leader or mid­level cadre . The second­stratum, are                           
those who are not affiliated with a political party and who had never worked within a                               
party. Four out of five participants were politically affiliated, with three out of the four                             
participants belonging to NSN and the final first­stratum participant belonging to the                       
CPN­Maoist  Center  (see  Figure  1 ). 
2 Personal  Interview  Surveys  Methodology 
All interview participants were given the choice of their preferred interview location,                       
with the hopes that if respondents chose their preferred interview location, they would                         
be more comfortable and open during the interview process. All first­stratum                     16
respondents’ preferred interview location was their political party headquarters, while                   
the second­stratum preferred his residence. All respondents were formally interviewed                   
one time , with the average interview lasting 48 minutes. With participant consent, all                         17
interviews were recorded for transcription and analysis purposes. During the interview,                     
additional notes were taken using a laptop. All interviews were semi­structured,                     
meaning some questions were predetermined (with respect to the participant’s relation                     
to the study topic), with additional probing (based on the content of participant                         







 one interviewer/one participant), with one out of five interviews being conducted                     
dyadically (one interviewer/two participants) (see Figure 2 ). Additionally, four out of                     18
five interviews were conducted in English, with one out of five interviews being                         
conducted in a mixture of Nepali and English, at the request of the respondent (see                             
Figure 3 ). This latter interview was recorded and later translated into English, with the                           
help  of  a  translator.  
2 Data  Analysis  Methodology 
The collected interviews were listened to, transcribed and then coded using an a priori                           
code and emergent code  hybrid model. All a priori codes are derived from review of                             














After conducting a thematic analysis of the collected interview data, the emergent codes                         
that arose are power and clientelism (see Table 2 ). Emergent codes  were marked,                           






 mentioned by two or more participants being marked as an emergent code. The codes                           
that were most frequently mentioned by multiple respondents and given greater                     






Note: This table has been constructed to show the emergent codes and the associated concepts                             





Data were collected using opportunity sampling, with the duration of data collection                       
taken place for a two week period. My interview sample size is significantly small at five                               
responses. Additionally, the collected data is not representative of all the political                       
factions investigated, as the Baidya­led CPN­Revolutionary Maoist declined to take                   
part in the study. Finally, the party affiliated respondents outnumbered the number of                         
non­party affiliated respondents four to one, with NSN politically affiliated participants                     
represented  three  out  of  five  participants  (see  Figure  1) .  
Lack  of  Prior  Research  &  Reliable  Sources  on  Topic 
Although a lot research has been published on development of the Maoist movement in                           
Nepal, there is a lack of in­depth study on post­war Maoist parliamentary politics, with                           




 post­war articles available on Maoist factionalism are poorly written, lacking in­depth                     
and critical analysis. However, I mitigate for this deficiency of in­depth research, by                         
means  of  thoroughly  scrutinizing  and  cross­reference  with  multiple  sources. 
Heavy  Reliance  on  Qualitative  Data 
This studies relies heavily on qualitative derived from participant interview surveys. The                       
subjective nature of this method of data collection, increases the likelihood of response                         
bias. To minimize the probability of response bias, the use of leading interview questions                           
are avoided. Likewise, a hybrid coding method is utilized to analyze data, with both                           
quantitative and qualitative methods of data interpretation used to establish causal                     
linkages.  
Another limitation regarded to reliance on qualitative data is the problem of                       
reporting on such a sensitive topic. The participant interview survey asked questions                       
related to corruption and other forms of hypersensitive matters, which tend to be                         
difficult or uncomfortable people to discuss. However, the study was voluntary.                     





The results of the hybrid coding analysis show,  shifts in ideology was the factor most                             
associated with the splits between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. With shifts in                       
ideology , appearing throughout the responses of three out of five participants. While                        




 ideology was given the most emphasis, often explicitly noted as the primary reason (see                           
Figure 4 ). Shifts in agenda were associated with both the Baidya­Prachanda and                       
Bhattarai­Prachanda faction. The most emphasis was given to the role of ideological                       
shifts in relation to the Bhattarai­Prachanda split, with the following excerpts from the                         





K. Devkota: It is an alternative party: not leftist, rightist, communist,                     
non­communist. It is a conventional ideas [kind] of political party. The ideas, only                         
[...] could divide the society, they could not produce the solution. That's why, we                           
came to the conclusion that...capitalism, socialism, communism, anti­communism,               
Marxist, non­Marxist they [...] divide the society. We need to have a kind of                           
solution. That's why we created an alternative party. Alternative party is…an                     
idea. The idea is not following debate and discussion, but for solution. That's why                           
this  is  a  solution  oriented  party. 
 
Interviewer: If we can go back to the ideology of Naya Shakti Nepal. You said, it's                               
not  left  or  right,  but  it  is  a  frontist  alternative  party.  What  exactly  does  that  mean? 
 
K. Devkota: Until now, everybody will ask, "You are leftist, you are rights, you                           
are communist, you are non­communist?” It is because the tradition and tendency                       
of the formation of the party is the same. That's why, this is a very genuine                               
question...If you fix yourself in one ideology, the ideology will be static. A fast                           
moving society and static ideology will be a contradiction. It will never serve. For                           
a fast moving society, the ideology also has to be developed. If you are not willing                               
and able to develop the ideology, rather you stuck on the old world ­ 18th, 19th                               
and 20th century ideology ­ is it possible to solve the problem of the 21st century?                               





K. Devkota: [pointing at feet] Let's say, this is the left [points at left foot] and                               
this is the right [points at right foot]. If you try to walk with only your left leg,                                   
accidents will happen. Same thing if you try with only your right, same thing will                             
happen. Left and right! If you want to move forward, walk left and right! Left                             








K. Devkota: I don't think so. It is because of ideological things. [...] if                           
[CPN­MC] thought that, "Oh, the situation has already been changed,                   
continuation of the destruction oriented—struggle oriented party—will no longer                 
work" and changed their mind and join[ed] with us, maybe. Otherwise, we are                         
here. We don't have any plans to shift to the MC. But MC people...if they thought                               
that the right analysis—concrete analysis—of the concrete situation, which is the                     
core value of Marxism...if they came closer to that point, they would change and                           
they would join us. Otherwise...not possible. (Khimlal Devkota, Personal                 
Interview  Survey,  November  10,  2016) 
 
Interviewer: In your opinion, have the Maoist played a positive role in Nepal or a                             
negative  one. 
G. Thapa : [...] Since the formation of communist parties, they weren't even                       
united ideologically. There was division from the very beginning ­ pro­China,                     
pro­Russia and other factions. [There was a] Pro­Indian faction also…. At that                       
time,  there  was  also  ideological  differences  also.  
Interviewer: …[You mentioned] the Maoist [Center] have disappointed a lot of the                       







Interviewer: Prachanda, Baidya and Bhattarai agreed on everything ideological                 
[during  the  insurgency? 
 
D. Gurung: During the insurgency they all agreed, but later things changed.                       
When it came to the process, while they all had similar thoughts, they did not                             
completely agree on everything. Yet, there were not fractions like now. It was                         
after the peace agreement things slowly began to fall apart. The problem between                         
Between Prachanda and Baidya, the problem was that the system should have                       
been changed but it wasn't. The monarchy was gone, which was positive but                         
other things in the system didn't change, like there still isn't a republic established                           
and Baidya wasn't happy about this. Secondly, we were against semi­colonialism,                     
but even after the monarchy was gone semi­colonialism had not ended. In fact,                         
semi­colonialism grew and grew, now it's a new colonialism, with Indian                     
expansionism dominating Nepal. Things are not going in the right way. There is a                           
lot of compromising going on in the new government, that was Baidya's criticism                         
against Prachanda. But Bhattarai had very different thoughts. He thought Nepal                     




 Some of Prachanda's thoughts used to match Baidya's and some of his thoughts                         
used to match Bhattarai's, he walked a centrists line. It was difficult to unify                           





D. Gurung: According to Bhattarai he has quit communist philosophy. He does                       
not believe in it and is not following communist philosophy anymore. He does not                           
believe in Marxism­Leninism­Maoism anymore, that is why he is not in a                       
communist party. But Baidya still keeps saying that we should follow communist                       
philosophy. In the present situation unification between Prachanda and Baidya                   
could  happen,  because  Baidya  still  follows  communist  philosophy.  
 
Interviewer: In your opinion are there any other reasons why they split [with the                           
CPN­MC]? 
 





D. Gurang: Between Baidya and Bhattarai there is a possibility of unity. But it is                             
less of a possibility in Bhattarai's situation, because Bhattarai is not following any                         
communist philosophy. Yet, I believe in he realizes his mistake, rethinks and                       
revises his decision to not follow communist philosophy it may be possible. So far                           
he has not done this, so I do not think he will return. He is still saying he quit                                     






Power was the second factor most associated with the factions between Prachanda,                       
Bhattarai and Baidya. Power appeared throughout the responses the same amount of                       
participants as shifts in ideology did. The fundamental difference was that less                       
emphasis was placed on power as the source the splits, with power often emerging                           




 following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the finding power is                       
presented  using  representative  quotes  from  interview  participants: 
 
Interviewer: Can you explain more about those characteristics [by Prachanda                   
during  the  time  of  the  insurgency]? 
 
K. Devkota: [...] Dr. Bhattarai was always thinking about democracy, economic                     
prosperity and the upliftment of the condition of the people...Prachanda—                   
unfortunately —was very focused on power. During, that time monarchy was in                       
power. Once the monarchy took over, even during that time, Dr. Bhattarai always                         
focused on the three issues I've already mentioned...Prachanda said that, “Oh,                     
power is very near to monarchy. Compromise with the monarchy and we can                         
grab the power. Politics for the power." Dr. Bhattarai said that it would be a                             
critical  mistake.  
 
Interviewer: You said a couple of times that Bhattarai was focused on democracy                         
and Prachanda was focused on power. [...] What kind of power was Prachanda                         
focused  on? 
 
K. Devkota: In our context [...] position always attracts power, respect,                     
money—everything. Position. That's why everyone is a 'famous position' mongler.                   
[...]That's why Prachanda thought that, at any cost we need to be in power. If—                             
according to Prachanda—[...] if we changed the party, if we changed the agenda,                         





K. Devkota: I don't think so. [...] Prachanda and UCPN­MC which very much                         
focus on power, position and continuation of the same party, that felt pride that                           
this is the party who fought against the monarchy, who achieved the republic,                         
fought against the authoritarian government and achieved federalism. That's why                   
they are very much proud of that party. They don't want to change! (Khimlal                           
Devkota,  Personal  Interview  Survey,  November  10,  2016) 
 
Interviewer: In your opinion, have the Maoist played a positive role in Nepal or a                             
negative  one. 
G. Thapa : [...] The Maoist came as a force in 1996, when several factions united                             
to become one Maoist party [in reference to the CPN­MC] and then they started                           
the Maoist movement. During that time also, there were different factions within                       
the party, led by Baidya, led by Bhattarai, led by Prachanda and other small                           
groups when they united. But, in the eyes it was not divided before 2006. So there                               
were pro­Indian, pro­Nepali and these kinds of things. When they [in reference to                         




 when a party comes to power, you know that there will be problems? Everyone                           
wants to be in power, to be minister or something like that. So it was not an                                 
ideological division as such, I don't think. [...] First, when Baidya splitted there                         
was a problem of money. The Maoist accumulated huge amounts of money from                         
local sources ­ capturing and killing many people ­ and encroaching many                       
properties on the village level. All the money was in Prachanda's name. [...] One                           
of the reasons they splitted were for power. Second, was for wealth.. [...]                         
Basically, not ideological differences. I think in Nepal there are not ideologically                       
decorated—of course there are ideologies—but they never followed this Marxist,                   
Leninist and Maoist. Right now they have a lot of explaining to do, they have lots                               
of money, power and some kind of relations. They do not drink any local drinks                             
here; they go only for scott drinks or high level drinks. Basically, it was not                             
ideological and was not purely for power. (Ganga Thapa, Personal Interview                     
Survey,  November  11,  2016) 
Interviewer: In your opinion are there any other reasons why [Prachanda,                     
Bhattarai  and  Baidya  split]? 
 
D. Gurung: There might be secondary reasons [...] it could have been because                         
of personal egos, like who is getting what position in government. Third, individual                         





The results of the hybrid coding analysis indicate that shifts in agenda was another                           
secondary factor which contributed splits between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya.                   
Shifts in agenda were reflected in the responses of by two out of five interview                             
participants, coming third in terms of its predominance in the collected data (see                         
Figure 4 ). Shifts in agenda were only mentioned by respondents affiliated with the                         
Bhattarai­led Naya Shakti Nepal. S hifts in agenda were only mentioned in relation to                         
the Bhattarai­Prachanda faction. The following excerpts from the collected responses                   






 Interviewer: Can you explain more about those characteristics [by Prachanda                   
during  the  time  of  the  insurgency]? 
 
K. Devkota: Yea. Basically, Dr. Bhattarai was always thinking about                   
democracy, economic prosperity and the upliftment of the condition of the people.                       
These are the issues, democracy, development and improved conditions. These                   
three issues, related with the democracy and democratic parties very close to                       
democratic parties. Prachanda —unfortunately—was very focused on power.               
During, that time monarchy was in power. Once the monarchy took over, even                         
during that time, Dr. Bhattarai always focused on the three issues I've already                         
mentioned, democracy, development and economic prosperity. Prachanda said               
that oh, "power is very near to monarchy. Compromise with the monarchy and                         





K. Devkota: ...In the Nepalese context, one to three. First, the agenda of the                           
politics has been changed, after the promulgation of the constitution…[and] the                     
agenda changed. Second[ly]...Nepalese politics has been starting to fight against                   
the establishment, for the struggle, for the movement, for the dismantling of the                         
establishment. But, right now...is already started for construction... development,                 
second reason. Third reason, we fought against the system...Now, we need to                       
fight against the condition of the people. So, by these [...] reason...agenda of the                           
politics have already been changed [...]. Now, this is a completely new situation                         
and with a new situation, old political parties and a continuation of the old                           
conventional political party will not work. Let's say UCPN­Maoist, why we [in                       
reference to him and Bhattarai] split? UCPN­Maoist was funded to fight against                       
the establishment, fight against the monarchy, fight against the authoritarian                   
system, fight against the exclusionary system, the Hindu kingdom [...]. Now,                     
everything we have achieved and again, continuation of the same party doesn't                       
make any sense. An objective of the foundation of the UCPN­Maoist was                       
different...to fight, to dismantle, to remove. Again, continuation of the party means                       
again agenda must be a continuation...Now, the [...] agenda has also already                       
changed. So, we need to have a new political party and what we [in reference to                               
him and Bhattarai] tried first, we tried our best to change the whole party from                             
destruction to construction, development and economic development, first. We                 
failed. Secondly, we tried with like minded people within the party, we tried our                           
best. Second, we succeeded. Some of us were within the party of the                         
UCPN­Maoist, like minded people we came out and we started. [...] It is not                           
actually splitting, it is a new initiation ...new initiation of the political party for                           
economic prosperity. [...]Not only UCPN­Maoist, all the other political parties                   
also, they never talked about development. They never talked about economic                     






 Interviewer: It seems that Prachana and Bhattarai had a lot of ideological                       
disagreements from the beginning, so why do you think Bhattarai stayed with the                         
CPN­MC  so  long?  
 
K. Devkota: [...] Actually, it's not a rivalry, the major understanding was that                         
after the promulgation of the constitution, the agenda of the party would be                         
changed. By changing the agenda, the agenda­based party would also need to be                         
changed. That was a basic and tacit understanding between Prachanda and Dr.                       
Bhattarai and it was endorsed in our party [in reference to the CPN­MC]                         
document also. But, when the promulgation of the constitution, Prachanda was                     
very much a powermonger. He felt power would be safe in continuation of the                           
situation and party. Bhattarai said that, "Whatever safe or not doesn't matter. This                         
is the right time to change the party's structure—objective—because the agenda                     
has changed. The situation has been changed, that's why Dr. Bhattarai and we                         
thought that with the promulgation of the constitution, this is the right time to                           
initiate a new phase of political party and a new kind of political party, with a new                                 
agenda.  (Khimlal  Devkota,  Personal  Interview  Survey,  November  10,  2016) 
 
Interviewer: Why did you decided to join to Naya Shakti over the CPN­MC, seeing                           
how  you  were  never  politically  affiliated  until  now? 
 
R. Dhakel: [...] the agenda of the other party was to form the constitution in                             
their favor, so we [in reference to Naya Shakti political leaders and  cadres ] see                           
no vision in the party now for further development. So, that was the peak of the                               
party's agenda because that was the major agenda they have taken when they                         
started. So when they reached their agenda, that was one level fulfilled. We don't                           
see that they can go any further now, because that was the only agenda at the                               
central level that they were proposing and when it was met, there was a                           





Contrary to my working hypotheses derived from my conceptual framework (eg.                     
corruption as a potential factor of Baidya­Prachanda split), corruption did not emerge                       
in the collected data as potential reason for the Baidya­Prachanda split or the                         
Bhattarai­Prachanda split. Alternatively,  corruption  arose as a theme within                 
CPN­Maoist Center party politics as a whole. CPN­Maoist Center party corruption                     




 4 ) . The following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the finding                       
corruption  is  presented  using  representative  quotes  from  interview  participants: 
 
Interviewer: So a lot of people [...] suggest that the Maoist are corrupt [and that]                             
they no longer practice revolutionary ideology, they are now like the bourgeois...To                       
what  extent  do  you  [find  this  to  be]  true. 
 
K. Devkota: [Devkota chuckled] Million dollar questions. Actually, during the                   
time of 2000, one document has been passed, "Development of Democracy in                       
21st Century". [...] In this document ­ it's a very short document ­ in this                             
document it says that if the party is not controlled by the people, the party will be                                 
corrupt and it will take an autocratic form. [...] Then after, people became                         
corrupt, autocratic and they always focused on power, rather than people's                     
prosperity and economic development and the country's best interest...and that's                   
the truth. Two things, when we came into power―being the largest party―then                       
issues came up. Inside and outside two issues came up, cantonment…almost                     
thirty plus thousand PLA were confined in a cantonment and the government had                         
supplied money for feeding them and the corruption happened with that money.                       
Another issue came up, with all the Maoist [Center] party leaders during the                         
peace process and when they came to power, they became corrupt. Rampant                       
issues came up. The party itself initiated and formed two separate commissions,                       
in the party. One led by [...] responsible for investigating the cantonment issues.                         
Another, by [...] responsible for investigating the property of the party leaders.                       
Both commission reports almost identified the corrupt people and corruption. Time                     
and again, they insured they would be punished, but it never happen. Now, the                           
commission report is nowhere. [...] gentleman he died, he is no more now and the                             
commission report is also no longer public. It is not me saying this, it is what the                                 
report  says.  (Khimlal  Devkota,  Personal  Interview  Survey,  November  10,  2016) 
 
Interviewer: In your opinion, have the Maoist played a positive role in Nepal or a                             
negative  one. 
G. Thapa : [...] when Baidya splitted there was a problem of money. The Maoist                           
accumulated huge amounts of money from local sources―capturing and killing                   
many people― and encroaching many properties on the village level. [...] All the                         
money was in Prachanda's name. (Ganga Thapa, Personal Interview Survey,                   
November  11,  2016) 
Interviewer: What part if any does corruption play in Nepalese politics and Maoist                         
party  politics? 
D. Gurung: Even in this communist party [in reference to CPN­Maoist Center,                       
people aren't able to be true communist. So those who aren't real communist, they                           
might be corrupt. It's an individual problem, not a communist party problem. The                         
people we have guided in this party accept communist philosophy and practice it.                         




 communist should, they prioritize their personal interests. Those people in the                     





The primary objective of this study was to identify the causes of the factions between                             
Maoist insurgency leaders Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. Thus, participant interview                   
survey questions were formed with this objective at the core. Participant responses that                         
aligned with the primary objective had predominance in the collected data. The second                         
most predominant responses appertaining to the general nature of Nepalese political                     
culture, in which power and clientelism are reflected within the collected data (see                         
Figure  4) .  
Power 
Power was the emergent code reflected in the collected data, with three out of five                             
respondent's reference power in the general context of political culture in Nepal (see                         
Figure 4 ). The following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the                       
finding  power  is  presented  using  representative  quotes  from  interview  participants: 
 
Interviewer: You said a couple of times that Bhattarai was focused on                       
democracy and Prachanda was focused on power. [...] What kind of power was                         
Prachanda  focused  on? 
 
K. Devkota: [laughs] In our [in reference to Nepali politics] context,                     
position...position always attracts power, respect, money ­ everything. Position.                 
That's why everyone is a “famous position” mongler. If I am in position, you                           
came to me [laughs]...anybody of respect would be comfortable to give respect                       
to me and then anybody else will come with me, with money also. That's a basic                               






 Interviewer: In your opinion, have the Maoist played a positive role in Nepal or                           
a  negative  one. 
G. Thapa : [...] you know that when a party comes to power, you know that                             
there will be problems? Everyone wants to be in power, to be minister or                           
something like that. (Ganga Thapa, Personal Interview Survey, November 11,                   
2016) 
Interviewer: What part if any does corruption play in Nepalese politics and                       
Maoist  Center  party  politics? 
 
D. Gurung: Communist philosophy is anti­corruption. Communist philosophy is                 
against corruption, but all people can't be communist. Even in the communist                       
party, people aren't able to be true communist. So those who aren't real                         
communist, they might be corrupt. It's an individual problem, not a communist                       
party problem. The people we have guided into this party accept communist                       
philosophy and practice it. So it depends on how many people accept and                         
follow communist philosophy. In the communist party's philosophy it says the                     
party should not be corrupt. But the corruption in it is connected to private                           
properties and individual interests amongst communist leaders. Communist               
philosophy should be ranked higher than personal interests in the party. In                       
general, many people say they are communist but do not practice as a                         
communist should. They prioritize their personal interests… (Dev Gurung,                 
Personal  Interview  Survey,  November  17,  2016) 
Clientelism 
Finally , clientelism was the second most predominant emergent code reflected in the                       
collected data. The theme of clientelism emerged in the responses of two out of the                             
five interview survey participants, in association with political culture in Nepal (see                       
Figure 4 ). The following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the                       
finding  clientelism  is  presented  using  representative  quotes  from  interview  participants: 
 
Interviewer: I've read, along with the corruption that is found in Nepalese politics,                         
many articles say that clientelism one of them. How have you seen this played out                             
in  parliamentary  politics?  
 
K. Devkota: [...] Our conclusion is that Nepalese political parties change—not                     
as a change agent—into a center of corruption. MC now has 200..2,000 plus                         
central committee members. The central committee members decided that they                   
are not allowed to work. They are not allowed to work. It means the party will                               




 commission. The party nominates some of them to state power, they will feed the                           
party cadres, some commission agents, some tenders, some bureaucrats, some                   
businessmen with whom they have those type of relationships with and they will                         
feed them. That means corruption—center of corruption. The political parties                   
have come a center of corruption. We [in reference to Naya Shakti Nepal] came                           
to conclusion that this is the main problem and correction needs to start from                           
ourself, from the political parties itself, political leaders themselves. That's why                     
we started being transparent. (Khimlal Devkota, Personal Interview Survey,                 
November  10,  2016) 
 
Interviewer: [You mentioned] the Maoist have disappointed a lot of the country...                       
do  you  see  more  people  becoming  royalist,  wishing  that  the  monarchy  was  back? 
G. Thapa: In India there are good things. In India—when I was there— there is                             
a fixed system. The senior most person will be the principal, whoever he or she                             
may be. The next senior most will be the vice­principal. There is no politics!                           
Senior most in the department will be the head of the department. It will be for                               
two years. After two years, the next senior most will be the head of the                             
department. This system was introduced by the British in India. In every field                         
also, if there are competent persons within the institution bring them up! But right                           
now, what is happening [in reference to political happenings in Nepal] is if you                           
have a very close relationship with your resource minister you will be the                         
electricity board chairman, without having any experience. So we have to                     
discourage  any  political  appointment  in  technical  fields.  
Interviewer:  Do  you  think  clientelism  plays  a  role  in  Nepalese  politics? 
G. Thapa: This is very sad one of the very biggest factors is also is                             
clientelism...doing for the...house and horse! First house, family, relatives,                 
nephews, brother and sister­in­law. They want to give some kind of benefits and                         
post. For example, the son of Prachanda is the also the secretary of Prachanda.                           
The prime minister's son, is the secretary of the prime minister. This kind of                           
clientelism is there. This is one of the big problems! First, house and horse means                             
that they want to make money for themselves. Second, the want to make money                           
for the party. Third, they want to give the pride to their followers. This has been                               
happening since 1990, this isn't a new thing here. Even before 1990 it was a                             
one­party system, where certain people benefitted. After that also, those who                     




Shifts in ideology was the a priori code most associated with the factions between                           




 shifts in ideology as a primary factor), derived from the study’s conceptual framework                         
based on the analytical hypothesis presented by Sharma (2016), Sedhai (2016)                       
Himalayan Times (2015c) and (2016b). In the collected data, shifts in ideology  were                         
presented with more emphasis in relation to the Bhattarai­Prachanda split, than the                       
Baidya­Prachanda, though the data shows ideological differences played a role in both                       
splits. I contend the reason for this nuance is due to the drastic switch in Bhattarai’s                               
ideological orientation. Unlike Prachanda and Baidya, who profess to follow the                     
communist ideology ofMarxism­Leninism­Maoism, Bhattarai has renounced communist               
ideology entirely. Instead, practicing—what has been described by NSN party                   
spokesman Khimlal Devkota as— “frontist” ideology (Khimlal Devkota, Personal                 
Interview  Survey,  November  10,  2016).  
Power was allocated as a secondary reason for the factions between                     
Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. Although monopolization of power was proposed                   
earlier in the study as a potential factor, based on the information dispensed in Gilmore                             
(2012) and (Jeevan 2013), power was not added to the conceptual framework of the                           
study. This decision was made due to the articles’ partisan presentation of information.                         
In spite of this, power was a common theme that emerged from the data. While  power                               
was a significant theme referenced in context to Nepalese political culture, it was mostly                           
emphasized specifically in the context of the Bhattarai­Prachanda faction by interview                     
survey participant Khimlal Devkota. While Devkota’s alignment with Bhattarai (and                   
NSN) must be taken into consideration when evaluating his claims against Prachanda,                       




 (2012) and Jeevan (2013), which states that Baidya and Bhattarai often criticized                       
Prachanda  for  his  monopoly  over  party  resources. 
Shifts in agenda was another secondary factor associated with factions                   
between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, coming emerging as third in terms of its                         
predominance in the collected data. This finding supports the working hypothesis (eg.                       
shifts in agenda as a potential factor of the Bhattarai­Prachanda split), based on                         
information presented in Himalayan Times (2015) and Agence France­Presse (2016).                   
All responses coded for shifts in agenda were acquired from NSN affiliated                       




Much research remains to be done of topics related factionalism, in the Nepalese                         
context.While my researched touched upon this issue, the complexity of this subject                       
matter calls greater in­depth analysis. Future works includes, a comparative in­depth                     
study of factionalism with respect to Maoist oriented parliamentary political parties in                       
Nepal. While each Maoist parliamentary party can be studied separately at each node,                         
understanding factionalism within Nepalese revolutionary politics requires an in­depth                 
historical examination ofMaoist political parties individually, in relation to each other and                         
the  greater  Nepalese  political  system  as  a  whole.   
2 Summary 
This study is a product of the analyzation of factionalismbetween the Maoist insurgency                             




 the splits to ideological difference or  shifts in ideology :  power and  shifts in agenda                           
was found to have influenced the factionalism between Bhattarai, Baidya and the                       
Prachanda­led CPN­Maoist Center.  Shifts in ideology was found to be the primary                       
reason for the Baidya­Prachanda split, power playing less of a significant role in the                           
split, with shifts in agenda not indicated to have been a factor in Baidya’s decision to                               
leave the CPN­Maoist Center. On the contrary,  shifts in agenda was the primary                         

















Nom de guerre:  an assumed name under which a person engages in combat or some                             
other  activity  or  enterprise 
 
Panchayat raj: the political system of Nepal from 1960’s to 1990’s. In Nepal, the                           
panchayat system had four tiers, functioning at the village, town, district and national                         
level. Traditionally, each caste­group in Nepal would form its own panchayat  or                       









































Note: This table has been constructed to show the emergent codes and the associated concepts                             
from which they arose in order to enhance the understanding of analysis methodology and                           
research  findings. 
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